The Return of News Corporation

The Speaker Lounge, Digital Matters 2012
Charging the Devices
1025 hrs.

In an excellent post in the Company Town blog over at The Los Angeles Times, Jonathan Landreth describes News Corporation’s announcement that it is purchasing just under 20% of Beijing-based Bona Film Group. (“News Corp. buys stake in Chinese film studio”)

The deal is interesting for several reasons. First, it marks a strategic departure for News Corp., which has in the past preferred to own larger stakes in its China ventures. It is also the first major investment News Corp. has made in traditional media since 2006, when CEO Rupert Murdoch told a meeting of industry executives in New York that he’d hit “a brick wall” in China.

Second, it is interesting because News Corp. is now leading from behind in China, preferring to play a fast second rather than trying to beat the rest of the industry. Similar linkages between Legendary Pictures and Orange Sky Golden Harvest, DreamWorks Animation and Shanghai Media Group, and Walt Disney and the Ministry of Culture/Tencent have been announced over the last year.

Despite some secrecy around specifics of the deal and Murdoch’s real intentions behind it, the move represents a wiser China strategy than News Corp.’s previous, dingo-in-the-butcher-shop approach. The history of foreign business in China has been dominated by a preference for speed over calculation: if we don’t get in early/first/biggest, the thinking went, we have no chance of success. It now seems that Murdoch has learned from costly experience the fallacy of such thinking, and now that Legendary, DreamWorks, and Disney have paved the way, he has followed.

Neither News Corp. nor its CEO have been idle these past six years, either. A quiet charm offensive has apparently been underway for at least the past two years, a period during which I think News Corp. has done a lot of listening and learning, understanding what is possible and permissible for a foreign media company here, and calibrating its ambitions accordingly. Many whom have dealt with the News kraken or one of its tentacles can attest that this is an uncharacteristic approach: normally it is News that defines what is possible in a given market.

I suspect, therefore, that this is a first step for News with Bona, and that we can expect the relationship to mature and expand based on the signals that come from the Party and the market in the next several years.

This is without doubt a deal to watch.

Jacques and the Need for China to Change

Deng Xiaoping bust in the Zhuhai High-Tech Zone

Deng Xiaoping bust in the Zhuhai High-Tech Zone (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

China’s path to reform | Martin Jacques | Comment is free | The Guardian.

In this well-written editorial, Martin Jacques captures why the Party’s next generation of leaders needs to engage in a rethink. The key graf:

First, the era of cheap labour and low value-added production is coming to an end as the economy becomes increasingly sophisticated: a major shift in economic strategy is under way. Second, China has acquired a panoply of global interests that require its foreign policy, presently based on keeping itself to itself, to be rethought. Third, the enormous growth in social inequality, combined with mounting corruption, has fostered a sense of grievance that, if unchecked, could threaten the country’s stability. And fourth, major political reform must be instituted.

The important takeaway here: this is not a matter of a change in a single dimension of national power, but a change in all of them. The fundamentals of the policy legacy left by Deng Xiaoping are now in question.

The Economist Nails the Case for Elections in Hong Kong

Consultation Document on the Methods for Selec...

Consultation Document on the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive and for Forming the LegCo in 2012 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Leaving aside any ideological preferences one might have, The Economist makes a realist’s case for elections in Hong Kong.

In this case, though, there are practical reasons for China allowing a proper election, with non-acceptable candidates running too. It would bolster the mainland’s pitch to Taiwan: that “one country, two systems” means what it says. Full democracy may also be the safest option in Hong Kong. The uneasy coalition of Beijing’s supporters on the island—tycoons, party hacks, trade-unionists—could fracture under the weight of another ludicrous selection process. As for everyone else in Hong Kong, they showed in 2003 that when denied electoral outlets for their frustrations, they will take to the streets.

via Hong Kong’s chief-executive “election”: The worst system, including all the others | The Economist.

I can add two more: it would offer the world an opportunity to see the Party administering a high-profile local election, thus adding a much-needed bit of buoyancy to China’s bid for global soft power; and it would provide a laboratory for the Party in its own efforts to evolve.

Reblogged from strategicaffairswa:

Pictures like this make clear that China is the country most threatened by North Korean missiles, and thus have the most to lose if North Korea goes rogue. China is undoubtedly doing something to keep this from happening, but what?

Not Just China: Russian Government Mobilizing a Cyber-Militia

Darkness Botnet and Russian Politics.

A fascinating look into the organized – and likely government-supported – world of Russian Hacking. Apart from the fact that it was a surprise to read an article on cybersecurity that didn’t even mention China, it provides a glimpse at how Putin seems to be building his own cyber militia. While that capability is aimed internally in this story, how hard would it be for the Russian government to switch targets to overseas servers?

Probably not very.

As tempting as it is to make China the world’s cyber-boogeyman, as this NPR article does, security experts like Jeffrey Carr take a more balanced view. Hacking and cyberwar is a global problem with multiple sources. We should not dismiss the role China plays, but we should not allow focus to shift totally onto China. Doing so only gives comfort to hackers in other countries while making us look both weak and blind to other sources of serious threats.

When Life Should Imitate Art

Meryl Streep in St-Petersburg, Russia

Image via Wikipedia

In the Hutong
Mahndei, Mahndei
0815 hrs.


In a brilliant essay in The Atlantic by Orville Schell, the Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society, the venerable China scholar captures a spontaneous moment in a performance in Beijing by Meryl Streep and Yo-Yo Ma and turns it into the best deconstruction of Chinese international relations that I have read in a very long time.

Every paragraph in the essay is a gem, but my favorite by far is this one, which elegantly encapsulates the conundrum of international relations in the 21st century:

From here on, as China’s wealth and power increases, its national challenge will be to start letting itself feel sufficiently reinstated in the congress of great nations that it does not need to wallow in narratives of victimization, or be so militant about grasping symbolic demonstrations of its equality or superiority. The highest stage of evolution for any truly great power is to reach that point where it is possible to transcend the notion of both inferior and superior, the better to cultivate a self-confidence that leads to modesty. This is a lot to ask of China, or any country. Even the United States, the strongest nation on the globe today, has only rarely demonstrated such national maturity.

Without descending too deeply into moral equivalence, Schell has taken both China and the U.S. to task for their failings in international relations: America, the global power made insecure by the Cassandras of national decline; and China, the emerging global power made insecure by its own, lovingly nurtured national inferiority complex. In one paragraph, Schell tells both countries to get over it, to accept their station, and to begin behaving like mature adults.

The Meryl Streep/Yo-Yo Ma performance that Schell refers to was intended as a piece of privately-funded public diplomacy organized by the Asia Society and the Aspen Center. It succeeded better than its organizers could have hoped, and captured the potential for public diplomacy to accomplish a very great deal. In a single moment, two artists offered proof that if China and America would just grow up, that new-found maturity would go over as well at home as abroad.

Event: The Massification of Chinese Education

In the Hutong
Shrinking the Elephant Arm
1341 hrs

If you are in the Midwest this week and have an interest in China’s education system, you may want to stop by the Kelley School of Business at Indiana University – Bloomington. The Research Center for Chinese Politics and Business is continuing their colloquium series with a talk by Dr. Susan Blum on the Massification of China’s Higher Education System: The Consequences for China’s Youth. Dr. Blum, who serves as Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Notre Dame, has spent some time over here and has put together a talk that will inform the debates around “Tiger Moms” and over the future of higher education in both China and the U.S.

From the event’s flyer:

From a low of approximately 3% just two decades ago to almost 25% in 2006, higher education is no longer an elite and rare good, but is increasingly “massified.” Such independent pursuit of limited opportunities has consequences for the nature of youth and the very meaning of childhood. Though the number of youth has been stabilizing because of China’s birth policies, the competition for entry into the expanding programs of higher education remains fierce. Debates about education often reveal debates about human and social ideals. As Mao and others showed, the very nature of education has the effect of changing society. Chinese intellectuals knew this a century ago, as New Youth drove reform; the current situation is both similar and different in instructive ways. We find enduring centralization and increasing privatization; social and individual goals; and focus on international competition.

The event is free and open to the public, so if you are up that way, please stop by. I’m hoping she comes out to Beijing to give her talk.

(Full disclosure – I’m on the advisory board of the RCCPB.)

Television Regulations: New Bottle, Same Wine (With Corrections)

State Administration of Radio, Film & Televisi...

State Administration of Radio, Film & Television offices in Beijing (Photo credit: Toby Simkin)

In the Hutong
Black Lung Control
1047 hrs.

In the Valentine’s Day edition of The New York Times, Andrew Jacobs describes the new regulations issued yesterday by the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), most specifically including two key restrictions: the prohibition of foreign programming during prime time, and the limitation of foreign programming to no more than 25% of the total air time on a channel.

There is some new content in the regulations issued yesterday, but contrary to the NYT headline, the major issues addressed vis-a-vis foreign content are not new: indeed, they harken back to regulations that have been in force since 1995. From the unpublished manuscript of a guidebook on Chinese television that I co-authored with William Soileau and Jeane-Marie Gescher in 1998, according to regulations then in force:

Foreign programming must not be distributed between 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., although actual enforcement varies according to the broadcaster.

and

Foreign programming must not take up more than 25% of total broadcasting time on a station basis.  In reality, while the rule is nominally honoured, many networks apply the quota on a channel by channel basis. Unofficial figures indicate that foreign programming may account for as much as 50% of programming.

The rules governing television are not increasing, as the Times suggests. What seems to be increasing is the degree to which they are openly flaunted by broadcasters. Let me explain.

China has had a wide range of laws and regulations restricting media (and many other industries) in place for a long time. What varies is not the regulations, but the degree to which they are enforced. Laws and regulations, as such, are not de facto restrictions of behavior so much as they are tools for the government to use when political conditions demand it. For that reason, what SARFT does on a fairly regular basis is issue notices designed to remind broadcasters that the regulations exist, and signal to them that enforcement looms. Usually, such initiatives come either when things get too far out of hand (i.e., 25% becoming 50%, as suggested above), or when something happens to make it an issue (Chinese producers complaining about access to TV time, or, say, a  leadership change.)

This is not dissimilar to the way I get my ten-year old to clean his room: I let him know an inspection is coming, and by the time I get there, behold! A clean room! The requirement to keep his room clean always existed. What was lax was the enforcement. What caused me to issue the edict to my son was either the room was getting too messy, or guests are coming over.

Jacobs quoted one Chinese citizen posting his disgust with the regulations on Weibo:  “They should really put Sarft in charge of food safety and have the State Food and Drug Administration regulate TV shows — that way we’ll have safe food and good entertainment.”

I would wager the person posting this was either very young or unborn when the regulations were actually issued. The issue that has provoked SARFT (an underfunded, undermanned, out-gunned agency if there ever was one) is the same that caused the food problem: China is ruled less by policy than law, and political expedience trumps enforcement – until the political expedients change.

UPDATE: Please read the comments conversation between Li Yuanyuan and myself. He raises some excellent points to rebut my point of view. He disagrees that enforcement was ever lax, suggests that it was always tight, and he explains why. We do not share the same memory of events, but he does point out that the prime time ban on foreign programming and the restriction of quantity of content was not in the 1995 Regulation #549.

Will China Actually Import “The Hunger Games”?

‘The Hunger Games’ In China | ThinkProgress.

“The Hunger Games” is apparently scheduled to show in China, according to this piece (h/t to Jacqueline in HK, aka @lantaumama for this.)

This movie, based on the first book of a trilogy telling the tale of a hardy young woman who inspires a rural uprising against a brutal repressive urban dictatorship, will either be pulled at the last minute when the censors actually WATCH the darn thing, or it will be the most subversive piece of democratic propaganda ever to sneak onto Chinese screens.

Or, as occasionally happens, the Chinese audience will take something entirely different from the experience than we would.

The Hunger Games (film)

Image via Wikipedia

Either way, it will be fun to watch what happens.

Apple’s China Strategy: Venturing to the Edge of Coolness

IPhone Scarcity During Chinese New Year May Give Samsung a Happy Holiday – Bloomberg.

Right before Chinese New Year

Apple Inc., Ed Lococo interviewed me for this story, asking me how much I thought iPhone sales would be affected by the company’s decision to sell the newest version of its handset via online channels only. The quote in the story is a good one, but there is more to what I told Ed.

First, I do not expect Apple unit sales to suffer severely from this shift in distribution. When the Chinese people want a product that is difficult to get, they tend to find ways to get it, as evinced by the huge gray market in iPhones that existed long before they were introduced in China. The Chinese consumers who can afford these devices are net-savvy, and the online store will not present a major obstacle, and they should continue to be available through China Unicom’s retail outlets.

I also expect Apple will see a jump in iPhone sales through Apple’s channels in Hong Kong and other major Chinese New Year travel destinations for outbound PRC tourists. However, I noted:

A large portion of Chinese New Year sales are about having the gifts in hand right now, so I expect that Motorola, HTC, and Samsung, all of whom offer Android devices competitive with the iPhone, will benefit among buyers who are ambivalent about the brand of their device or who were on the fence about Android.

Ed also asked me whether I thought Apple would use this as a justification to expand its distribution in China, adding carriers or retail outlets. I imagine Apple will continue to expand its stores, albeit slowly, but I also think they walk a fine line between stoking demand and burning its mojo.

Apple owes much of its profitability in China to the perception that its devices are highly desirable yet difficult to obtain. The company is likely loath to tamper with that aura by significantly broadening its distribution, and that doesn’t even address the engineering challenges of creating an iPhone that will work on China Mobile’s TD-SCDMA network. Apple’s problem is that once two or more carriers offer the device and the phone seems to become ubiquitous, the mystique falls away and Chinese consumers will look elsewhere for their desirable device.

Make no mistake: most of Apple’s recent converts in China are much less emotionally vested in the Apple ecosystem than their counterparts in Japan or the United States. Apple is making a valiant effort to change that, but it needs more time, perhaps years, to develop in China the devoted following it enjoys elsewhere. Until then, it needs to remain in the business of making pretty, hard-to-get devices for prosperous people.

The Beginning of the End of Outsourcing

Apple’s iPad and the Human Costs for Workers in China – NYTimes.com

In the Hutong
Working like hell
1530 hrs.

In what China-based business sustainability expert Richard Brubaker calls “the best piece to date on just how rotten [Apple's] supply chain is,” Charles Duhigg and David Barboza of The New York Times have actually done more than that. They have written a piece that underscores the ethical risks implicit in both outsourcing and offshoring.

Control is the Issue

You could argue that this story and the reception it is getting is a function, in part, of the end of the Steve Jobs Reality Distortion Field, or, as I overheard someone say the other day in reference to Apple, “the King is Dead, the Gloves are Off.” That may be true, in part, but I think that this story is the harbinger of a wider issue plaguing the global manufacturing sector, and the challenges Apple is facing with its suppliers are simply the most visible examples.

The problem goes deeper than the conflict implicit in asking a supplier to give you the best price AND to manage its business in a way that increases its costs. The mater of working conditions is part of a bigger question about the value and importance of control over the means of production. (Don’t worry, I’m not about to go off on a Marxist tangent here. Bear with me.)

I started my career managing the output of 30-odd factories and suppliers in greater China making furniture, jewelry boxes, and small gift items for a medium-sized US importer. I learned a hell of a lot from that job, but the lesson that has stuck with me throughout my career is that you cannot change what you cannot control. We like to think that a customer like Apple would, by virtue of the size of its business, be able to strong arm its suppliers into complying with its codes of behavior, or even “incentivize” a supplier to go along by raising prices. In reality, it is nowhere near that easy. Any customer, even one the size of Apple, exerts influence over how a supplier is run, but not control. A customer can exact some concessions from a supplier on factors outside of product features and quality, but at some point, any self-respecting factory owner is going to push back and say “you may buy from me, you may be my biggest customer, but you don’t own me. I’ll give in to you on some things, but beyond that, you need to let me run my own business.”

Outsourcing and Reputation

As long as governments, NGOs, unions, activist shareholders, and bloggers aren’t looking over the customer’s shoulder, as long as the supplier is compelled to operate according to strict occupational health and safety regulations, or as long as the customer’s customers don’t care, that is an acceptable arrangement. But if the supplier operates in an environment that rewards risking health and safety, has the world watching them online, or has an activist bunch of end-users, the risks of outsourcing grows until it lands the customer and supplier in the hot water that Foxconn and Apple find themselves in today.

Barring an incident that disrupts production, the costs to Apple of its supply chain problems are in goodwill and reputation. Apple, arguably, has amassed enough goodwill and reputation to be able to afford to pay such costs for a while at least. The rest of us must live in a world where we must guard our goodwill and reputation as the corporate crown jewels, spending both with care and amassing more if possible. Indeed, if we replace “Apple” in the NYT story with Nokia, Dell, or Samsung, the report would have very real and unpleasant ramifications for any of those companies.

Apple notwithstanding, we are leaving the age when spin, messaging, great products, and generous corporate philanthropy are enough to pave over corporate practices that governments, shareholders, and consumers find objectionable. We are entering an age where the Spin Gap, the difference between a company’s reputation and the reality of its behavior, is closing, and approaching a time when behavior and reputation are essentially the same thing.

Beyond Goodwill

I tend to harp on reputation and goodwill first because these assets, always important, have become both more important and more fleeting when bad news travels at the speed of Twitter. But the problems with outsourcing and the loss of control over production goes beyond the risk to reputation posed by supplier misbehavior.

We in the west have forgotten that much of the value of our companies create happens in production. The stock market rewards companies for outsourcing their production because of a short-term focus on cost savings and on superficial measures like return on capital. But investors ignore – because they cannot see or measure – the implicit value of keeping production in house.

But, as The Economist pointed out in a superb editorial comparing the fortunes of bankrupt Kodak with those of prospering Fujifilm:

It is easy to think that companies can compete by outsourcing production and focus on developing and marketing. But many innovations bubble up from the factory floor. Even Apple, a master in outsourcing and orchestrating manufacturing, has in-house expertise and occasionally acquires certain technologies. Today, as debates rage in America over the degree to which returns on capital exceed those from actual business operations, and the relative merits of employment in manufacturing versus the services sector, the history of Kodak is more relevant than ever.

The point about innovations on the factory floor deserves some amplification. Apart from the product innovations that come from the factory floor, innovations in the production process itself can become a huge source of competitive advantage. Ford, Toyota, Hewlett-Packard, and Dell are just four companies that built their success to a great degree on innovations in the production processes.

Owning production is a hard sell to a lot of American business, not just because of Wall Street’s expectations, but because so few young Americans learn production or operations management anymore, preferring courses in finance and marketing in the hopes of getting a job in an office. That does not take away from The Economist’s point. You start outsourcing, and not only do you lose control, you mortgage your future for near-term returns.

There is no shortage of companies who, consciously or otherwise, defend their future by hanging onto their factories. Two examples off the top of my head are Boeing and Intel. Boeing got so good at manufacturing that it was able to cut an entire time-consuming step – full-size mockups – out of the development process, going straight from computer model to production on the 777 jetliner. When the company tried to go the “design and market” route with the new 787 dreamliner, they got hit with a three-year delay on their critical 787 program and, until they took back production from several contractors, they were on the verge of sacrificing expertise in a critical new skill area: manufacturing all-composite aircraft components.

Intel has always been a leader in manufacturing processes, being first in the industry to try new, expensive, and often risky technologies, working out the kinks, and sustaining leadership as a result of that expertise. Even today, Intel outsources little: the company continues to build, own, and operate manufacturing incredibly expensive manufacturing facilities – from chip fabricators to pack-and-test assembly lines – because the company understands that there is more to their business than design and marketing.

And the idea of outsourcing would be anathema to Mercedes-Benz, Fender Guitars, Microsoft, or most companies in the service industries. In all of those cases, keeping the production close is either an important part of the value delivered or the very source of  company’s differentiation.

The Vote of History

Outsourcing has saved its share of companies and returned its share of profits. But the persistent challenges encountered in its execution by one of the smartest and healthiest companies in the world is a warning: short-term expedients do not create long-term winners. Those of us who love Apple and the products it makes and who understand the nature of its relationship with its suppliers (and their own ambitions) make us worry that the company is forgetting a key source of its uniqueness.

The upshot of the above is simple: two years from now even Apple could find its reputation savaged by the perfect storm of one bad product, one down quarter, and a mishap caused by a factory it did not control; or fifteen years from now it could follow Bethlehem Steel, General Motors, and Kodak into the ignominy of Chapter 11. Either would be the ultimate result of depending on somebody else’s factory for the production of Apple devices.

What is true for Apple applies doubly for the rest of us. The factory floor matters. It’s time to take it back.

Deconstructing China’s Nationalists

To Screw Foreigners by Geremie R. Barmé

In an essay from 15 years ago that remains one of the best background pieces on Chinese nationalism that I have ever read, professor Jeremy Barmé of the Australian National University delves into the historical and philosophical underpinnings of this rising ethos.

There is a growing consensus among Beijing-watchers that nationalism has replaced economic development as the primary driver of domestic Chinese politics on the eve of a generational leadership transition. For that reason, there is no better time than now to dive beneath the surface of this phenomenon and understand it from the roots.

I read Barme’s piece with great interest. While I didn’t come away with any profound conclusions, I see what is happening today with somewhat greater clarity. It also helps peer behind the Red Rhetoric of Bo Xilai’s campaigns to see something older and more elemental at work.

Not a short read, but a great one.

There is More to Tablets than Cheap vs. Dear

 

English: motorola xoom tablet

Image via Wikipedia

How Apple Can Keep Control of the Tablet Market – BusinessWeek.

GigaOM‘s Darrell Etherington believes that the way for Apple to sustain its dominance in the tablet market in response to challenges from the Kindle Fire is to offer a smaller, cheaper tablet. The case he makes – that a cheap tablet with a tightly integrated “content ecosystem” is the best response – is not a bad one, but it misses the wider point.

The issue with tablets going forward will not be large versus small or high-end versus low-end, but general versus specialized. The iPad, the Motorola XOOM, and the Samsung Galaxy Tab are examples of high-end, tablet format computing devices that are designed to perform an array of tasks. The Kindle Fire, despite the other things you can do with it, is designed to offer a quality book, music, and possibly movie experience. At doing other things, even browsing the web, it is somewhat weaker.

And this is not a bad thing. Not everybody wants a tablet to act like a laptop without a keyboard, and in fact the great untapped opportunity is in finding ways to target the format for specific experiences or vertical markets where the iPad or XOOM would be too much machine for the job.

Brands Add Value

Back in the Hutong
Finally, blogging again
1657 hrs.

As the debate over if, when, and how China will begin to produce global brands continues, someone quipped today that China will start building brands only after it starts creating products people want to buy. That’s a fair point, but I don’t think it goes far enough. As Thys De Beer wrote last year:

In the 1920’s WK Kellogg said: “The purpose of business is not to make a profit. What a dreary and demeaning description. The purpose of business is to add value to people’s lives. The consequence of doing that well is that you make a handsome profit.

Debate that if you will, but I think that Kellogg’s statement reflects

an idea that has yet to germinate among Chinese executives, and that therein lies the core reason why China has yet to produce global brands.

US Listed Chinese Companies: The Clock is Ticking

U.S. Regulators Push Chinese to Resume Auditor-Inspection Talks – Businessweek.

The U.S. is ratcheting up the rhetoric in the battle to improve the quality of auditing being done on Chinese firms listing or listed on U.S. stock exchanges.  The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCOAB) are trying to get the China Securities Regulatory Commission to require joint inspections of auditors from both the US and China for Chinese firms listed in the US.

The Chinese, claiming concerns over the revelation of “state secrets” are having none of it, seeing the US request as a violation of Chinese sovereignty.

PCOAB Chairman James Doty is apparently getting frustrated with his Chinese counterparts, who have abruptly cancelled bilateral discussions on the issue.

‘We can’t simply pretend that China is different,; he said. ‘You can’t come sell your securities here and ignore the fact that the law requires and people want to know that the auditor’s been inspected.’

Doty is not a paper-tiger bureaucrat that the Chinese can afford to just ignore:

The [PCOAB], which was created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 after accounting scandals contributed to the collapses of Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc., has authority to de-register China-based auditors, which could start a chain reaction leading to companies being unable to list on U.S. exchanges.

Doty, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, and Senator Chuck Schumer all seem to believe that this tough talk will compel China to give in, believing that China is more afraid of losing access to the capital in US markets than they are of giving auditors a glimpse at the dirty laundry of Chinese state-owned enterprises, or even of China’s actual level of defense spending.

They may be right. But many Chinese policymakers, offered the choice of putting state secrets at risk or funding Chinese firms outside of U.S. equity markets, will be motivated to take the latter course. As I noted in an earlier post, the growing complexity of listing Chinese companies in the US and the maturation of China’s own equity markets make the repatriation of offshore listings an increasingly tempting option both for regulators and companies.

Don’t get me wrong: I think that whatever else might be motivating them, Doty, Schapiro, and Schumer are right to be trying to protect the interests of investors. At the same time, though, they have to recognize two hard truths.

First, it is still unclear whether U.S.-based auditing firms operating in China are passing PCOAB inspections. Not only should the PCOAB attend to that task first, it should make the results of those inspections public. Failing to do so makes US regulators look hypocritical.

Second, the long-term outcome of this effort is less likely going to be a major improvement in corporate transparency in China than to hasten the shift of Chinese equities out of the U.S. and into Chinese exchanges. While US bourses boast far greater liquidity than China, the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges have access to a large, relatively undemanding pool of capital hungry for hot new listings. PRC exchanges could easily absorb a steady, modest stream of Chinese companies de-listing in the US and listing (or conducting new offerings) in China.

Doty et al are to be commended for their efforts. Sadly, corporate transparency in China will only improve when the Chinese government demands it in order to protect Chinese investors and/or the global position of Chinese markets.

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