Flags In The Ground, laying out a viewpoint on a key or controversial issue.

PR World

Over the past four years I have discovered that there is an implicit belief among many US public relations (PR) practitioners – especially in the large global firms – that PR around the world will develop to become similar to what it is in the US, and will follow the US lead as the profession evolves.

Axiom: it will not. If the PR industry manages to rise above its straightjacket of inertia and hubris, it will find itself changed by forces from India, China, Latin America, Russia, and Africa.

What keeps me awake at night is the fear is that ethics in the name of expedience will be the first sacrifice in that process.

Memory Loss

Watching the winds in the semiconductor industry, especially in China, hints at a coming consolidation of products. To wit:

  1. Within 18 months, Intel will be back in the memory business in a big way, but not in the way we think about memory today.
  2. Within three years they will not be alone.
  3. Within five years, specialty memory producers will either diversify, be in mortal danger, be M&A bait, or some combination thereof.

 

Wanda and Hollywood: Three Questions

The craft of filmmaking is a perilous one, a balancing act between the art of cinematic storytelling and capricious public taste. Overt inclusion of foreign propaganda would likely be a destabilizing ingredient in any film, just enough to turn a potential blockbuster into an expensive turkey, undermining a studio’s reputation in the process.

But facing a U.S. administration that is hostile to China (at least on the surface), Hollywood’s new Mandarins, in particular the squires of Wanda’s interests in The Business, must be prepared for three questions that are likely to arise in the coming months from either the public, a Republican-dominated Congress, or the new Administration.

First is a matter of US law. In what is known as the Paramount Decree, in 1948 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on an anti-trust case against Paramount Pictures, a ruling that compelled the separation of motion picture production and exhibition companies. On its face, Wanda owning both production assets like Legendary and exhibition companies like AMC appears to be a potential violation of US Law, and Wanda will be required to explain why it is not.

The second question touches on the issue of whether films made by a studio owned by a Chinese company will produce propaganda. To this point, we have focused on Wanda CEO Wang Jialin’s promise not to turn the studio into a propaganda machine. For what it is worth, I believe that is Wang’s intention. But let us not forget that the Party still holds considerable sway over Wanda’s fortunes and its core assets in China. Wang’s best intentions aside, Wanda must prepare to answer this question: what will Wang Jialin do when or if Xi Jinping comes calling with an unrefusible offer? Can Wanda afford to decline the call of Beijing if that call should come?

And finally, a third question. We have, in the last forty years, taught China how to create everything from machine tools to smartphones, and Chinese companies now lead the world in the creation of those products. Motion pictures and microchips are not analogous, but what has ensured Hollywood’s continued global leadership in filmed entertainment has been an accumulated century of technical and process know-how that results in marketable films if not global entertainment phenomena. Hollywood as a whole must be prepared to answer: at what point will Hollywood have sold its Mojo to Beijing? And to what degree does the presence of Chinese conglomerates in Hollywood speed that process?

At the very least, these companies must have answers at the ready. Ignoring or dismissing them will only serve to convince potential opponents that there is more to Wanda’s motives than a good business deal.

 

Acronym of the Week: “HIPRA”

HIPRA, acronymHuge International Public Relations Agency, a term that refers to a public relations firm with over 1,000 employees or fee billings in excess of US$250 million.

These massive public relations corporations usually combine a broad global footprint with a headcount large enough to be able to service extremely labor-intensive PR work. These are firms like Edelman, Blue Focus, Burson-Marsteller, Ogilvy, Weber-Shandwick, and the like.

With Blue Focus, China has an entry in this list, and it is worth watching as BF looks set to grapple with Edelman for the title of the biggest, particularly as market trends are pointing away from the scale-based business model upon which both have built their businesses.

 

Concept of the Week: Conglomeration Mystique

Conglomeration Mystique – concept – a business ethos with two components.

First, the conviction on the part of a successful entrepreneur or company that a) because it is successful in one field it can be successful in any field to which it applies its brand or capital, and b) that to be a truly great company a firm must be in a diverse range of businesses rather than focus on a single field, all regardless of actual market conditions. Entrepreneurs with this ethos frequently cite examples like Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and Steve Jobs as proof of the concept.

The second component is the compulsion, usually the result of the above, to build a conglomerate business, either via acquisition or startups, and usually accompanied by rapid geographic expansion.

Related condition: gigantism

If you believe the writings of Tom Peters – whose thinking informed a lot of my early business career – the conglomerate is a really dumb idea. Peters was not necessarily wrong. During the economic boom following World War II, Corporate America decided that the best, easiest path to growth was acquiring profitable companies with stock, excess cash, and cheap debt.

The decade 1973-1983 threw a sequence of challenges at US businesses that exposed the weaknesses of these companies. The end of cheap energy, the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the end of the Gold Standard, the rise of Japanese and German companies, the emergence of corporate raiders, and the growing disruption of technology all landed on US companies in rapid succession. The conglomerates were the largest and most unwieldy of America’s corporate dinosaurs, and they crumbled: Fansteel, ITT, LTV, Olin, Teledyne, Esmark, Litton, Continental Group, and Sperry were all conglomerates in the Fortune 100 in 1970, and are today either gone or are leftovers of their former selves.

The verdict – and now the accepted wisdom, at least outside of China – is that specialization and focus pay. While a degree of strategic diversification might be good, lumping radically disparate businesses together under a single roof creates more management problems than it solves.

Donning my historian’s hat, I think the verdict is more qualified. During times of rapid economic growth and boom, using cash-cow businesses to fund expansion and acquisition into other promising markets is a viable strategy. And there are exceptions.  GE has used a long sequence of acquisitions and spinoffs to keep it a going concern, swinging from industry-to-industry like Tarzan swinging on vines through a jungle. And call it what you will, Warren Buffet’s Berkshire-Hathaway is aught more than a very well managed conglomerate, drawing free cash-flow from insurance operations to fund its growth elsewhere.

So conglomerates can work under some very specific circumstances. Where Peters’ research still stands, though, is that corporate conglomeration is not a viable default strategy, especially when it is used as a substitute for an imaginative strategy.

When any company in China – whether a large state-owned enterprise or an entrepreneurial operation like LeEco – appears to be turning itself into a diversified holding company, the burden of proof rests on the company to demonstrate that there is some really smart thinking behind the activity, and that it is not simply hiding strategic failure.

 

Standards of Influence

One of the early chapters in my book Public Relations in China focuses on the importance of the government as a stakeholder, and the means by which a non-Chinese firm could make its influence felt in the policy-making process.

In a time when the collusion between moneyed interests and government power has become a challenge in countries around the world, we have to ask, “is there any circumstance in which it is right for a commercial interest to influence policy and regulation?”

My answer is a qualified “yes.” There is no shortage of companies that have proven themselves to be bad actors, wielding a degree of influence far out of proportion to that wielded by other stakeholders, and too often acting in ways that undermine the popular best interest.

At the same time, there are occasions when it is proper for a company to make its point of view known to those proposing regulation, and, indeed, there are circumstances in which a company’s decision to withhold its expertise from the regulatory process represents an abandonment of the firm’s civic duty.

What we need is a standard, a framework within which companies can offer their input in the regulatory process without drowning the popular interest. In an effort to incite a discussion on the topic, I’ll suggest the first six criteria.

  • For those questions of regulation where a commercial entity has, by virtue of its collective experience or expertise a clearer understanding of a problem than a legislature or executive agency, and the commercial entity has nothing to gain or lose from the resolution of the question, that entity is obliged to offer its information and analysis to influence policy for the greater good.
  • For those questions of regulation where a commercial entity has, by virtue of its collective experience or expertise a clearer understanding of a problem than a legislature or executive agency, and the commercial entity stands to gain or lose from the resolution of the question, that entity may to offer its information and analysis to influence policy provided that it is open about its interests.
  • At no time should a commercial entity use its influence to mute or silence other voices, even those in opposition.
  • At all times the information provided to the government agency must be factual and presented in as clear a manner as possible.
  • At no time may any commercial entity provide direct or indirect payments to any government official or agency that would serve to influence the resolution of a regulatory question.
  • All efforts should be publicly disclosed in real time.

Arguably, China’s central government has never been as open to outside (and particularly foreign) influence as have those of the West. Looking at the lobbying-industrial complex that has turned entire neighborhoods of the US capital into ghettos of influence peddling, that is not entirely a bad thing. But the nation needs legitimate pathways to allow an appropriate degree of input by all stakeholders, and foreign companies are no exception. Those pathways should never be closed to companies that adhere to a clear and publicly-acceptable set of standards.

On Ending Media Pay-offs in China

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On Monday Advertising Age published my editorial calling for an end to the common practice of paying journalists in China for coverage. You can read the editorial here.

Early reactions are mostly supportive, but there are a number of people who believe that the problem will never be solved. I respectfully disagree. Historically the media in every society have gone through a corrupt phase. Current journalistic practice and standards in the developed world did not suddenly appear ex nihilo: nearly all were created to address an extant practice rather than to anticipate one that might arise.

Viewed against the canvas of history, China’s media are relatively young, and the industry has experienced profound disruptions in the past 70 years. There has been too little time for standards and high-minded practices to develop, and we are probably a generation away from seeing Chinese journalism rise above the shackles of propaganda, yellow journalism, and corruption.

But rise they will, and the sooner we discard the notion that there is no hope for these practices to end, the sooner the problem gets fixed.

The Third Way on Xi

English: "Long live the great Communist P...
English: “Long live the great Communist Party of China” in Xinhuamen, Beijing ‪中文(简体)‬: 新华门左标语“伟大的中国共产党万岁” (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

“Is the Chinese dragon losing its puff?”
Peter Harcher
The Canberra Times
March 16, 2015

Professor David Shambaugh’s recent essay in the Wall Street Journal suggesting that China’s political system is about to hit some very rough times (“The Coming Chinese Crackup“) has provoked intense debate. Peter Harcher’s article written in response offers a neat summary of what makes Shamgaugh’s conclusions so debatable.

I nevertheless absolutely reject his conclusion which I find astonishingly ill-informed. The pervasive sense of dramatic change is, I have found, combined in almost all Chinese minds with satisfaction and confidence that the change is urgently needed–indeed long overdue—and in the right direction.

It also demonstrates that the American academy has powerful competition as a source of cogent analysis on Chinese politics.

Any serious discussion of China’s future must include non-Academics like economist Arthur Kroeber and Australians like Geremie Barmé of the Australian National University and David Kelly of China Policy in Beijing.

Barmé, for his part, writes off Shambaugh’s collapsism as the view of an American deeply anxious about America. Kroeber, an American himself, argues that the Party remains as strong and adaptable as it was in 2008, when Shambaugh wrote his excellent China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation.

My problem with both sides is the determinism implicit in the arguments. The Party’s collapse might not be imminent, but neither is its adaptability without real limits, imposed upon it by important groups and individuals within its own ranks. I find it hard to believe that Barmé and Kroeber would argue that point.

We thus must agree that there may be circumstances under which the Party might prove insufficiently adaptable to avert an existential crisis. And before you protest, let us agree that there may be circumstances under which any polity, however strong and adaptable, might face the same limits. In that case, the answer is neither “the Party will collapse” nor “the Party is too adaptable to collapse.” It is, rather “under what circumstances would the Party face the danger of collapse?”

Like most of us, neither I nor my clients can afford to treat China like its future is a game of roulette: bet on Red, the Party stays in power. Bet on black, and it collapses. Creating strategy in business means contending with all possibilities, balancing them, and coming up with a pathway that appropriately addresses them.

We can be neither Cassandra nor Polyanna. We should not overestimate the considerable challenges Xi Jinping faces as he guides the nation through roiling and uncharted waters, but none of us can afford to underestimate them.

Concept of the Week: WaterTech

WaterTechnoun – the discipline combining elements of of biology, agronomy, engineering, environmental science, and electronics to find ways to make more efficient and effective use of limited water resources.

In an upcoming post in The Golden West Review, I suggest that the California drought is really a great big hint from the universe at one of the greatest business opportunities facing both China and the United States. The companies and countries that are able to develop the products, technologies, skills, techniques and services that significantly reduce per-capita water usage will be the winners in the 21st century.

As the steam slowly leaks from the microelectronics and telecommunications revolutions that created Silicon Valley, we need to start looking for the next revolution. WaterTech will no doubt be a major part of that, and Sand Hill Road would be stupid to leave the opportunities to foundations and foreign firms.

Get off the plane

English: Business class at grand opening of Be...
English: Business class at grand opening of Beijing–Shanghai (Jinghu) High-Speed Railway. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In the Hutong
Watching the pigeon hutches
1011 hrs.

Speaking to a group of students touring China from the UK, I asked how they traveled from Shanghai to Beijing. Their response, of course, was that they flew.

I understand the rationale for flying inside of China. Under the best circumstances it is fast, and other forms of travel are harder to arrange from overseas.

That said, my recommendation to anyone organizing a trip to China for a group of executives, students, or scholars is to do yourself and them a favor: on the leg between Shanghai and Beijing, put them on a high-speed train, in either First or Business Class.

(Be aware that for reasons that escape everyone but the Ministry of Railways, Business Class is the better, more comfortable, and more expensive of the two.)

Even if flights are on time, the elapsed time from downtown Shanghai to Downtown Beijing (or the reverse) is not that much greater, especially if you purchase your train tickets in advance. And if there are flight delays (and there are frequent delays, because of weather, VIP flights, or because the Air Force feels like it), the trip can actually be faster. But that’s not the best reason to take the train.

The best reason to take the train is that the people you are squiring across China will actually get to see out their windows something more than modern cities and clouds. They will see farms, villages, half-completed roads, factories, and the insides of a half-dozen cities of a million souls or more that they had never heard of.

Send them home with visions of modern cities in their heads, and they will get the wrong idea about China, making the same mistake made by instant China experts like Thomas Friedman and Niall Ferguson. Expose them to a bigger slice of China, and they will understand that a large part of the nation is still 40, 70, of 100 years behind Shanghai. Then they will start to understand the forces that drive this Asian Leviathan. And is that not the point of bringing a group to China in the first place?

Code

“In the future, coding will be a core skill, not a specialization.”

— Why I am learning Python at the age of 49

Setting the Stage for Chinese Innovation

Near People’s Square, Shanghai
Skyline in Silhouette 
0700 hrs. 

Walking the floor at both CES in Las Vegas and Electronica China in Shanghai within a ten-week space provides one with a clear view of how far Chinese enterprise has come, and, equally important, the degree to which international technology businesses have lost their former dominance in China.

One could conclude from these impressions that multinational tech companies are in a state of permanent decline in China: Beijing’s unstated but ongoing policy of import substitution has succeeded, and foreign companies are fighting a losing battle. You don’t need to go to trade shows for anecdotal evidence. Just look in purses and backpacks: ZTE, Huawei, TCL, Lenovo, and Yulong are five of the top ten mobile device brands, and they’re gaining on the global giants.

But if you dig a bit deeper, as you can at a show like Electronica, you find that the opportunities for foreign tech companies have not disappeared: they have evolved. To understand why and how, it is useful to start by looking back on how the tech business developed in China.

From Buy to Make

Since the beginning of reforming and opening in China in 1978, the nation has essentially gone through three phases of foreign involvement in technology-based industries.

The first phase was imports, when the government focused on bringing urgently-needed products like personal computers, telephone switches, automobiles, machine tools, and other technology-based products into China. The need for these products, most of which were essential to ease key bottlenecks in the development process, was so urgent that key ministries were permitted the use of precious foreign exchange to purchase those goods.

China’s leaders always expected, however, that the nation would begin producing these goods on its own, preferably in local companies, but realistically in joint ventures with global technology companies who would bring three essential ingredients: the products, with their component technologies; production know-how, with process technologies; and the capital to build the production facilities. This was the second phase: the shift to local production.

Fast Followers

By the mid-1990s, though, another shift began to take place. As the global tech giants ramped up production in China to a mass-scale, local firms began manufacturing their own technology goods. Local firms began to dominate production, using a “fast-follower” approach: “maybe we won’t be innovators, or even the first to market with a given innovation, but we will come to market so soon after the innovation leader that we will still reap our share of the market.”

By last year, the payoff of this shift had become apparent. Chinese high-tech companies were long past needing foreign manufacturers to teach them how to build high-tech products, to help them implement cutting-edge production processes, or even to finance the construction of factories. Those local firms unable to bootstrap their own capabilities and finance now had a vast stable of local and foreign companies ready to provide the necessary technology, and finance, thanks to cash flow and capital markets, was no longer a problem.

Innovation, however, remained a challenge. While a handful of local tech companies –  notably (but not limited to) Huawei, ZTE, Xiaomi, and Leovo – had begun to innovate, widespread innovation that would offer a more sustainable competitive advantage (and a larger share of profits) still seemed a ways off.

Enter the Innovation Platforms

And there it remains today.

This gap between efficient production and value-driven manufacturing is the heart of the next opportunity for foreign firms. While the days of foreign brands utterly dominating technology markets in China may be past, more than ever China’s manufacturers need a steady stream of innovations upon which they can base their own innovating.

Technologies that serve as the foundation that allows others to innovate are what we can call innovation platforms. Five factors make innovation platforms stand out from other technical advances:

Significant – The core innovation is a genuine advance that is both useful and relevant;

Substantial – There is a obvious, large, and diverse market for products based on the innovation that offer substantial profit potential, and the technology is easily commercialized;

Shared – The company promulgating the core advance is more interested in creating an ecosystem than a monopoly, i.e., it is content with focusing on supporting and enhancing the core technology and not getting into the business of its customers/licensees;

Stable – Any subsequent changes in the underlying technology are likely to be iterative, not major, for several generations of products. This makes it economically viable for companies to invest in R&D based on the innovation platform.

Supported – Rather than serving as a glorified patent troll, the companies that develop innovation platforms invest heavily in resources designed to assist product developers create viable commercial products, such as on-site engineering support, system validation labs, extensive documentation, or developer groups. In addition, the company continues to invest in improving the core technology.

Early Innovation Platforms

Many innovation platforms take the form of acknowledged industry standards. Examples like Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and USB could be considered a form of innovation platforms, in that their technologies enabled the creation of products and even companies.

But when we talk of innovation platforms, we are really looking at products and technologies that spawn not only products, but companies and entire industries. Some illustrative examples:

The Xerographic Process: Invented by Chester Carlson and later commercialized by Haloid/Xerox, which begat the photocopier, the laser printer, desktop publishing, and many specialized sectors;

The Intel 8000 microprocessor family, that together enabled the creation of the personal computers, stand-alone video games, and a half-dozen major industries;

Qualcomm’s CDMA: CDMA enabled the commercialization of the internet, created the telematics industry, and is on its way to recreating the automotive, trucking, and healthcare industries, among others.

Each of these companies took an indirect lesson from the failure of Thomas Edison’s Motion Picture Patents Company, an industrial trust that tried to control the film business as well as the manufacture of cameras and film stock. It was, arguably, Edison’s greatest failure. By exercising a modicum of control over the core technology, supporting it, advancing it, and making it available on reasonable terms, Xerox, Intel, and Qualcomm each fostered the creation of immense economic value.

Platforms for the Future

In a world where industrial and engineering capability is a scarce quantity, the easiest way to make a return on a major innovation is to create a vertical industry around it, building the components, creating the product or system, and distributing it under your own brand. The Bell System did this for nearly a century with telephones, and IBM and a handful of other companies did this for the first three decades of the computer industry.

But when the ability to design, engineer, and industrialize complex products is widely distributed, as it is today, robust companies are built on either using innovation to enable industries, or in building on innovation to create industries.

For the time being, Chinese companies are (generally) comparatively better at building industries based on key innovations, and European and particularly US companies are (generally) comparatively better at consistently creating core innovations that can serve as the platforms for those industries. This does not mean that no core innovations will come out of China, or that the US is no longer capable of product development and commercialization.

But it does suggest that the richest opportunities in China for foreign companies, particularly those in science, engineering, and technology-based industries, lies in licensing and enabling Chinese manufacturers, rather than competing with them.

The question facing tech companies, then, is whether and how to make use of the company’s innovations – or an ongoing stream of them – in order to serve as a profitable and indispensable platform for Chinese innovation. And for those of us who watch this market, the pressing question is “in which industries will the next round of innovation platforms emerge?

I leave the first question to the companies themselves. For the second question, my early research points to transportation, healthcare and biosciences, construction, energy, and the environment. I know: I have my chips on a lot of spots on the roulette table. In the coming months, I look forward to sharing with you why I think things are going that way.

McKinsey Endorses Our Thinking

“Next-shoring: A CEO’s guide”
Katy George, Sree Ramaswamy, and Lou Rassey

McKinsey Quarterly
January 2014

The end of China’s time as the uncontested factory floor of the planet has become something of a meme. If that has failed to come to the attention of any of the world’s CEOs, McKinsey’s consultants make sure they get caught up.

My take is that McKinsey is late to the party. I made most of these same points two years agoI called it “right-shoring.” In such a circumstance, I would have thought that McKinsey, seeking to retain “thought leadership,” would have offered deeper insights. They don’t, even though they provide endorsement to my original thinking.

Thanks, McKinsey!

For the record, check out:

The Beginning of the End of Outsourcing,” Silicon Hutong, February 7, 2012

China and the Rightshoring Movement,” Silicon Hutong, December 4, 2012

 

Branding from the Ground Up

In the Hutong
Surrounded by snow
1721 hrs.

I am usually suspicious about “thought leadership” pieces on marketing that come out of the major management consultancies. These firms have proven strengths in organizational design, operations, production, logistics, and strategy, but when they venture into marketing they tend to stumble for a range of reasons that would fill a book.

I was doubly suspicious of the McKinsey Quarterly article “Building Brands in Emerging Markets” by Yuval Atsmon, Jean-Frederic Kuentz, and Jeongmin Seong because their approach lumps all emerging markets together.  But while the article has its shortcomings, there are nuggets of critical insights in the paper for businesses operating in China.

China is Different…

The authors correctly note that Chinese consumers generally rely more on word-of-mouth to guide their purchasing decisions than do their counterparts in most other countries, especially the U.S. The in-store experience is also more important here. Chinese are more accustomed to changing their decisions at the point-of-purchase rather than leave a store if they can’t get what they came in to buy. Indeed, many consumer marketers find that point-of-sale is the second largest chunk of their budgets (next to advertising) because they will lose at retail what they won in advertising.

Finally, it is increasingly important in China to eschew a purely national approach to marketing and target consumers with a more local approach. China is a patchwork of local habits, climates, dialects, diets, and sub-cultures, and we are reaching the stage in the nation’s development where marketers can no longer afford to ignore that.

…But the Difference is Changing…

Aside from its geographic overreach (“emerging markets” are not all the same) and its broad-brush approach to consumer goods, I have two major quibbles with the article. First, the authors offer a snapshot of consumer behavior but ignore trends that might undermine their points; and second, apart from geography they treat all Chinese consumers as an undifferentiated mass.

First, where people get their advice is changing. While the authors state that only 53% of China’s consumers find online recommendations credible, they leave out the fact that well over half of China’s consumers don’t have access to the Internet.  If you are a company (like, say, Coca-Cola) who needs to reach most or all of China’s 1.2 billion consumers, the Internet is about half as important as friends and family. Conversely if, like a growing number of companies, your target consumer is likely to be online – that is, if she is young, urban, educated, and has money to spend – the importance of the internet is sorely understated.

What is more, as credible online resources emerge, there is mounting evidence that the 560 million Chinese who can get online are giving outside sources greater credibility. As early as 2009, Sam Flemming’s CIC Data noted that over half of online consumers actively sought online feedback on a product prior to purchase, and that nearly 90% paid attention to online buzz on a product whether they sought it out or not. In that case, the Internet runs a close second to friends and family in the purchasing decision.

The importance of the retail shop in the purchase process is changing as well. I spoke with a senior marketing executive for a consumer electronics brand last week who told me that online sales – e-commerce – had suddenly become more important than in-store sales. A growing number of consumers was apparently hearing about the product from advertising, checking with family, checking online, going to the store to look and feel, and then going home and buying the product online. China’s online retail business has now passed an average of $40,000 per second and continues to grow. If the final point of sale is online, how does that change McKinsey’s equation? We don’t know: McKinsey ignores the internet.

…So let’s not Whitewash the Nuances

Finally, the authors ignore the importance of several demographic factors, most specifically age. Although it should be axiomatic, a growing body of research in China delves into how differently the increasingly prosperous older (55+) consumers behave than their under-30 counterparts. Friends and family are essential to the elderly, but for most purchasing decisions the youngsters are relying on peers and the Internet. Older consumers are more likely to purchase in a store, younger consumers are more likely than the grandparents to buy online.

Perhaps I’m being overly critical of the authors: these are, after all, nuances that would not fit into a 3,000 word article. But these oversights point to the problem with taking the management consulting approach to marketing. Grand strategies and broad generalizations may make for mind-tickling patter with clients, but as Ludwig Mies van der Rohe said, “God is in the details.” The day is long past when marketers can view Chinese consumers as an amorphous mass with uniform habits, and I would wager that applies in Brazil, India, and South Africa just as well.